Legislative Option for Cannabis
in Australia-
National Drug Strategic Plan Monograph Series no. 26
Contents:
Introduction
Policy
Goals (A 14 Point Criteria for a Good Drug Policy)
Cannabis
in Context
History
Laws & International Treaties
Five
Legislative Options
Compulsory Treatment
Evaluating
New Legislative Approaches To Cannabis
Conclusion
Summary
Introduction (pp. ix
- 2)
Australia's National Drug Strategy is
widely acclaimed, both in this country and internationally, as a world
leader.
It features a balance between action
addressing the demand for and supply of drugs.
It involves a partnership between the
government and non-government sectors.
It addresses all drugs, both currently
licit and illicit.
Above all, its overarching goal is to
minimise the harmful effects of drugs and drug use in Australian society.
It does not have the impossible-to-achieve
goal of eliminating drug use nor the simplistic approach of addressing
just one class of drugs (the currently illicit ones), the approaches taken
by some other nations.
This paper is concerned with the legislative
options available for cannabis, and the impact of those options on the
community at large and on the law enforcement sector.
Policy goals (pp. 3 - 9)
Given the importance which is assigned
to setting clear goals for any major social policy, it is surprising how
infrequently discussion of drug policy is preceded by a precise specification
of what the policy is intended to achieve. Too often, goals are either
global (e.g. to reduce drug use) or unattainable (e.g. to eliminate drug
use), and as such they allow for many interpretations.
Similarly, goals are often stated in
such a way that they could be achieved through a number of quite contradictory
strategies and at vastly different costs. This report starts from the
proposition that it is important to know what are the requirements for
rational drug policy in general, and what are the objectives of cannabis
policy specifically. In this context, it is important to address the issue
of drug policy as well as drug legislation. The link between policy, legislation
and implementation is important and must be factored into these considerations.
The development of policy and legislation
relating to cannabis should take into account the following issues:
1. Arguments that apply to the most
appropriate control regime for one drug need not - and often do not -
apply to others.
2. Drug policy should be drafted
to take account of the different patterns and types of harms caused by
specific drugs.
3. The details of control regimes
are crucial determinants of their outcomes. Such details should not be
left undefined.
4. Any analysis of control regimes
should attempt to estimate their effects on both consumption levels and
patterns of use.
5. Control regimes should not
be considered in isolation from the problems of implementation and enforcement.
6. Arguments about the consequences
of drug use should be separated from arguments about morals.
7. Options should be evaluated
on the basis of evidence of damage.
8. Any policy should recognise
the changing nature of the drug problem and be able to change with it.
Additionally, all policies should be reviewed periodically to ensure that
they are still relevant to the current circumstances.
9. Policy should be made in
light of the costs of control as well as the benefits.
10. The goals of drug policy
should be realistic.
11. Discussion of policy options
should include a specification of which harms they are intended to reduce.
12. Discussion of cannabis policy
(and drug policy generally) should recognise the existence of multiple
and sometimes contradictory goals.
13. Policies to discourage cannabis
use should be shown to be effective or be changed.
14. The harms caused by the
control regimes themselves should not outweigh the harms prevented by
them.
The application of these principles in
a given situation should lead to the development of explicit policy goals
relating to cannabis.
It is likely that priority will need
to be assigned between the available goals, as they are frequently inconsistent.
Nevertheless, the explicit specification of the goals which policy and
legislation are intended to achieve is essential if they are to be properly
articulated and evaluated.
Cannabis in context: history,
laws and international treaties
(pp. 11 - 36)
Cannabis has been used for many thousands
of years. It has been used for the production of material products such
as clothing and rope; for its medicinal properties; and for its psychoactive
properties. Cannabis was used medicinally in Australia until the mid-1960s
and is currently used in many parts of the world, in the form of hemp,
for the production of cordage, clothing, etc.
Australian drug laws, like those of many
other countries, closely followed the development of international drug
treaties. The influence of the United States of America in the conception
and development of treaties and related international instruments has
been enormous. As a result of lobbying by Egypt, Turkey and South Africa
(who were supported by the United States), the 1925 Geneva Convention
on Opium and Other Drugs was the first such convention to cover cannabis.
The Convention required the parties to 'enact effective laws to limit
to medical and scientific purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution,
export and use of cannabis in the form used for medical purposes at the
time' (South Australia 1978, p34).This remains the state of cannabis in
the international community.
Numerous enquiries into drug use and
trafficking have been conducted both in Australia and overseas. Australian
committees have generally been very cautious about recommending changes
to the legal status of drugs.
Nevertheless, a number of high level
Australian committees of inquiry have recommended the liberalisation of
legislation relating to cannabis, or at least that such liberalisation
be carefully considered.
In 1977 the Senate Standing Committee
on Social Welfare (the Baume Committee) produced its report Drug
Problems in Australia - an Intoxicated Society? which looked at the
use of licit and illicit drugs in Australia. Like other reports, before
and since, it recognised differing harms caused by different drugs and
concluded that drug use was more a social/medical problem than a legal
one.
It also considered the social and
personal harms flowing from the illegal status of some drugs and recommended
that:
o 'legal controls [should]
not [be] of such a nature as to inhibit rehabilitation of the user or
to cause more social damage than the use of the drug causes' (Australia
1977, p 164);
o cannabis legislation should
be enacted that 'recognises the significant differences between opiate
narcotics and cannabis in their health effects and in the criminal impact
on users and the community (Australia 1977, p 164);
o possession of marijuana for
personal use should no longer be a criminal offence and should only attract
a fine;
o penalties for the possession of hashish,
hashish oil and purified THC should remain at their present levels because
of the potency of these drugs.
The Commonwealth Government response
to the Baume Committee report, however, was both tardy and hostile. The
Prime Minister appointed a conservative judge to head up a Royal Commission
into Drugs, whose final report called for more social control, heavier
penalties, more enforcement authorities and recommendations not to change
the laws.
The 1978 New South Wales Joint Parliamentary
Committee upon Drugs' Report into Drug Abuses came to similar recommendations
as the Baume Committee report, as have several other inquiries since that
time. The most recent inquiry at the national level was the Parliamentary
Joint Committee on the National Crime Authority which reported in
1989, and at the State/Territory level, the Australian Capital Territory
Legislative Assembly's Select Committee on HIV, Illegal Drugs and Prostitution,
which, in 1991, tabled its report on Marijuana and other Illegal Drugs.
The focus of the report was on the 'effectiveness of the current legal
and social controls on drug taking, with particular reference to marijuana'
(Australian Capital Territory 1991, p1).
Proceeding from a belief in harm minimisation
and from the view that drug use can never be completely eliminated, the
Committee recommended that:
o possession of up to 25g of
cannabis no longer be an offence; o possession of more than 25g of cannabis
and less than 100g of cannabis attract a fine of $150;
o possession of more than 100g
of cannabis should incur a penalty of $5000 or two years imprisonment,
or both;
o cultivation of five cannabis
plants should no longer be an offence; and
o there should be no offence
of self-administration in respect to cannabis.
Cannabis
in Australia
In the main, cannabis was little known
or used in Australia until the 1960s. Nevertheless, the drugs legislation
which was introduced in most of the States and Territories towards the
end of the 1800s and early 1900s (primarily concerned with the smoking
of opium by Chinese people) provided a framework for the prohibition of
cannabis.
The first Australian controls on cannabis
were introduced in Victoria in 1928 legislation which penalised the unauthorised
use of Indian hemp and resin. Following the 1925 Geneva Convention, the
Commonwealth was the first government to succumb to the exhortations of
the United Kingdom. It proscribed the import of cannabis in 1926 through
the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Proclamation and at the same time banned
the export of cannabis.
Australia's attitude to drugs and drug
laws became entrenched at an early stage. Manderson (1993) has described
it very clearly - lack of a domestic problem (and this particularly applied
to cannabis) meant that legislation was accepted uncritically; no pressure
groups existed to stimulate debate or mount opposition, and the absence
of a drug problem meant that it was impossible to evaluate the costs and
benefits of the prohibitionist model - it was simply assumed that the
model worked effectively.
The Commonwealth introduced new federal
laws on drugs - the Narcotic Drugs Act 1967 was the first of these. Drug
laws and drug policies from this time onwards can be characterised as
follows. First, a law enforcement approach became firmly entrenched at
the Commonwealth level with the important role played by Customs, which
had no interest in any medical or public health model of drug use or supply.
Second, penalties were increased. Third, there were changes to basic principles
of criminal law - such as reversal of the onus of proof - in order to
make convictions easier (Manderson 1993). Last, there was a shift in legislative
emphasis away from drug users to drug traffickers.
Efforts to bring the States into line
were less successful. Cannabis use in Australia was not a problem and
there appears to have been little domestic agitation in support of proscription.
This was followed by corresponding legislation in the other jurisdictions
as the years passed. From the 1960s, however, the Commonwealth has become
increasingly involved in legislation relating to cannabis (particularly
with regard to its importation). The penalties relating to cannabis cultivation,
possession and use were generally quite severe during the 1960s and 1970s
but have tended to lessen since then in most jurisdictions, at least with
regard to the minor offences of possession and use of small quantities.
Perhaps the most significant legislative
changes have been the introduction in 1987 in South Australia and in 1992
in the Australian Capital Territory of expiation notice schemes. Under
these schemes, a person found committing a minor offence relating to cannabis
is given what amounts to an 'on-the-spot' notice. If the prescribed penalty
is paid within the prescribed time then no court appearance is required
and no conviction is entered. If the person receiving the expiation notice
fails to respond to it, however, the normal court processes follow.
People considering the legal status
of drugs and the possibility of legislative change need to be cognisant
of Australia's international treaty obligations. Although some difference
of opinion exists with regard to the legislative options for cannabis
which are available to Australia within the scope of the international
treaties, it is clear that the policy of total prohibition currently followed
by most States and Territories is only one of a number of options which
are available.
For example, current Dutch attitudes
towards illicit drug use are said to arise from a number of factors peculiar
to Dutch society and history. First, realism and pragmatism. Second, a
belief in social pluralism. Third, an ideology or normalisation in which
'illicit drugs are seen as a limited and manageable social problem rather
than an alien threat forced on an otherwise innocent society' (Leuw 1991,
p2). Fourth, is the context of the criminal law itself. Dutch writers
stress that the criminal law is not perceived as enforcing social morality
but rather as 'an instrument of social control, whose results must be
assessed from case to case' (Ruter 1988, p6).
Five legislative options for
Cannabis in Australia (pp. 37 - 70)
Many legislative options are available
for cannabis, and much confusion exists in the terminology used to describe
them. In our view, the South Australian Royal Commission into the Non-Medical
Use of Drugs (the Sackville Commission) which reported in 1978 provided
the most useful categorisation of these options. The language used avoids
the terms 'decriminalisation' and 'legalisation' as these expressions
have quite different meanings for different authorities.The five options
discussed below capture all the approaches people have in mind when they
when they refer to 'decriminalisation' and 'legalisation', as well as
other options which these two words may or may not encompass.
The National Task Force on Cannabis has
been established and is reviewing legislative options for cannabis use.
NSW Premier Bob Carr has recently made certain positive statements regarding
decriminalisation. Clearly the time has come for formal choices to be
made. The Australian Institute of Criminology has been commissioned to
research various legislative options and has made a report concerning
five options which are set out below.
These are:
Total Prohibition,
Prohibition with Civil Penalty,
Partial Prohibition,
Regulated Availability
Free Availability.
The first option is Total Prohibition
Under the system of total prohibition
the use, possession, cultivation, importation, sale and distribution of
any amount of cannabis are treated as criminal offences. Total prohibition
can take a number of forms. In the United States, for example, the eradication
of all illicit drug use is a central aim of drug policy and it is thought
that total prohibition is the most effective means of reaching this goal.
Cannabis use is seen as part of a larger drug problem and is dealt with
as such.
The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA),
responsible for classifying drugs and updating classifications, has listed
cannabis in Schedule 1 of the classification scheme. Schedule 1 drugs
are seen to have a high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical
use in the United States and no acceptable safe level of use under medical
supervision.
The possession of cannabis can carry
a penalty of up to one year's incarceration and a fine of $1000 to $5000.
An offender can also be required to forfeit to the state all controlled
substances, raw materials or equipment used to manufacture, import or
export controlled substances, all conveyances used to transport controlled
substances, all money and property gained through contravening the Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), and all property used to facilitate violations of
the CSA. The proceeds of forfeiture are used to fund drug law enforcement.
Central to the US Government's policy
on reducing demand is the idea of creating a climate of intolerance towards
all drug use through concepts such as 'user accountability' and 'zero
tolerance'. 'User accountability' is the idea that individual users be
made to recognise that their drug use, no matter how minor it may appear
to be, is part of a drug problem that eventually results in the death
of some users (Wardlaw 1992).
The notion of 'zero tolerance' holds
that no drug offence should be allowed any degree of tolerance and makes
little distinction in terms of culpability between the different scales
of drug offences (US Bureau of Justice Statistics 1992). Drug policy in
the US is based on a deeply held belief that all illicit drug use is extremely
harmful, both in terms of the dangers it poses to users and in terms of
the dangers it poses to the fabric of American society. There is very
little distinction made between cannabis and other drugs. American policy
makers have tended to see drugs themselves as the central source of all
the ills associated with drug use in that country.
Analysis of the social context of drug
taking or of the relationship between drug taking and poverty have apparently
had little impact on the development of drug policy. It has been claimed
that those debating drugs policy in the US have blurred the distinction
between the effects of drug use and the effects of the prohibition of
drug use (Wardlaw 1992). Drug use is therefore thought to be inextricably
linked to violent crime, users are conceptualised as criminals, and policy
towards any level of drug use in punitive and coercive. This philosophy
of drug use is evident in the rhetorical language of US policy makers
who have called their drug strategy a 'war on drugs'.
The total prohibition policy, as
implemented in the United States, many other countries and most of the
Australian States and Territories, has clearly not achieved its intended
goal of substantially reducing cannabis consumption. This is despite an
increasing amount of resources directed towards achieving this goal. Both
the financial and social costs of law enforcement under an active policy
of total prohibition are high.
This policy fails to meet a number
of the crucial criteria for good drugs policy, stated above. Cannabis
policy has not been separated from that of other drugs; arguments about
the consequences of drug use have not been separated from the arguments
about morals; the goals of the 'war on drugs' are unrealistic; it appears
that the harms caused by the control regimes outweigh the harms caused
by the drug itself.
The Netherlands provides an example of
a quite different application of the total prohibition policy from that
observed in the United States and elsewhere. In The Netherlands, legislation
makes a clear distinction between 'drugs presenting unacceptable risks'
on the one hand, and 'cannabis products' on the other. In addition, a
clause in The Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure, known as the 'Expediency
Principle', states that the Prosecution Office may decide whether or not
to enforce certain laws, to prosecute or to initiate criminal investigation
on the basis of whether or not such action would be 'in the public interest'.
Using this clause, the Minister of Justice issued guidelines in 1976 for
the enforcement of drug laws and the investigation and prosecution of
breaches of drug laws.
Essentially it is these guidelines, rather
than the total prohibition legislation, that determines drug policy in
The Netherlands. According to the guidelines, dealing, possessing or producing
small amounts of cannabis do not require police investigation, arrest
or prosecution.
The country's drug policy is therefore
characterised by a number of factors: first, criminal law was never thought
to be a solution to the drug problem; second, it is recognised that the
basis of drug policy should be to minimise harm rather than eradicate
drug use, and; third, it is argued that drug policy should not be the
same for all illicit drugs.
This separation of cannabis from other
illicit drugs also has the effect of making the drug problem more manageable.
A low priority is also given to the investigation and prosecution of retail
dealing in cannabis, and police are only required to confront cannabis
dealers when they advertise publicly or conduct business in a provocative
manner.
This is part of a broader government
policy of 'normalisation', under which efforts are made not to marginalise
drug users, but to ensure that the harm related to their drug use is minimised
and that they are able to avail themselves of community services to the
optimal extent.
'Normalisation' recognises
that some type of drug use is natural to all human societies and argues
that the eradication of all drug use is an unrealistic policy goal. The
reduction of drug use and the social and individual problems associated
with it are felt to be far more reasonable policy goals.
Evaluative studies have shown
that cannabis use has not increased in The Netherlands since the liberalisation
of its policy relating to cannabis. Indeed, levels of cannabis consumption
are far lower than those in the United States, where the total prohibition
policy is rigorously enforced.
Unsurprisingly, Dutch commentators do
not subscribe to the view that their society is on the brink of collapse.
They argue that the 'hash cafes' have been integrated as normal urban
facilities and do not pose a threat to public order (Leuw 1991). The point
has also been made that visible drug use only signals failure if maintaining
a drug-free society is an aim of drug policy (Leuw 1991). In contrast,
the Dutch, who aim to prevent drug users from being marginalised, may
see visible drug use as a sign of success.
The savings made to law enforcement and
criminal justice budgets of not processing large numbers of cannabis offenders
are substantial and should be seen as one of the primary benefits of the
Dutch approach to drug policy.
It has also been argued that the Dutch
approach has led to safer patterns of cannabis use. First, the fact that
users of cannabis do not seem to turn to other more dangerous drugs is
used as evidence that the policy of separating the drug markets is working
(van Vliet 1990). Cohen (1988) argues that Dutch cannabis users, unlike
their counterparts in the USA, are more likely to consume the drug in
a safer way because the sale of drug paraphernalia such as waterpipes
is legal in The Netherlands.
Cohen has also argues that 'the knowledge
of how to regulate cannabis use has become an inconspicuous part of local
Dutch youth culture because the development of drug use rules was not
pushed out of the mainstream and into deviant sub-cultures' (Cohen 1988,
p24).
In a number of ways The Netherlands'
drug policy meets many of the criteria for good drug policy discussed
above.
The second policy option is that of
prohibition with civil penalties.
Under this option, the penalties for
the possession and cultivation of small amounts of cannabis for personal
use are dealt with by civil sanctions such as paying a monetary penalty,
rather than by criminal sanctions such as fines or imprisonment. Criminal
sanctions still apply to the possession, cultivation and distribution
of large amounts of cannabis.
The South Australian Cannabis Expiation
Notice (CEN) Scheme, introduced in 1987, and the similar scheme introduced
in the Australian Capital Territory in 1992 are examples of this option
in practice. As mentioned above, under the South Australian and ACT schemes,
minor cannabis offences such as the possession of small quantities, cannabis
consumption, or the cultivation of a small number of plants are expiable
offences, ie. if the prescribed penalty is paid within the specified period,
the offender does not have to appear in court and avoids a criminal conviction.
If the penalty is not paid, then the normal court appearance and possibility
of conviction ensues.
The evaluations conducted to date indicate
that the cannabis expiation notice schemes go a long way towards achieving
their goals and meeting the criteria for effective drugs policy discussed
above.
This option takes account of the different
patterns of use and harms relating to cannabis, compared with other drugs.
The policy and legislative development has been accompanied by attention
to the details of implementation, rather than being expressed in general
terms only. It recognises that much of the harm relates to patterns of
enforcement of cannabis legalisation, rather than to the use of the drug
itself.
The approach is realistic and the goals
attainable, focusing on minimising the negative impact on users of cannabis-related
involvement in the criminal justice system, along with producing society-wide
benefits in terms of lessening the financial costs to the criminal justice
system.
The major concern associated with this
approach (at least in South Australia where most experience has been gained)
is that there could be a social class differential in terms of the application
of the policy. In other words, people from lower socio-economic classes
could be disproportionately represented among those who fail to expiate
the offence and, consequently, obtain criminal records.
There remains some concern that the CEN
system, as to some extent any system allowing expiation in place of a
court appearance, puts pressure on some alleged offenders who claim not
to be guilty, to pay the fine rather than contest the charge. This poses
risks of legal costs, the trauma and stigma of appearing in court and
the additional costs and criminal record if convicted.
At a society-wide level, it appears that
the patterns of cannabis consumption are similar in South Australia and
the ACT to those found in the other jurisdictions which operate policies
of total prohibition.
The third legislative option is partial
prohibition.
This is an option which seeks to maintain
controls on the production and distribution of cannabis while at the same
time avoiding the costs of criminalising the use of the drug. Under partial
prohibition, it would remain an offence to grow or deal in cannabis in
commercial quantities. It would not be an offence to use cannabis or to
possess or grow it in quantities judged appropriate for personal use.
A number of variations are possible within
this broad outline. A small number of countries, for example Spain, have
followed this model. Other countries, such as Italy, have made possession
and use unlawful, but not criminally punishable. In none of these cases
does it seem that an increase in cannabis use has resulted from the establishment
of this legislative approach.
The partial prohibition model attempts
to use legal restrictions to discourage cannabis use by concentrating
on the prohibition of the commercial cultivation and supply and on the
advertising of the availability of the product. At the same time, the
model attempts to minimise the personal and social costs of the total
prohibition policy by allowing the use and personal possession of cannabis.
It assumes that cannabis is relatively less harmful than other drugs (such
as heroin), but that the harms associated with cannabis are sufficiently
serious to justify some level of restriction on its availability and that
criminal sanctions remain an appropriate instrument to achieve this restriction.
In the variant of the model that allows
cultivation for personal use, the model extends the recognition of the
practical difficulties and costs of enforcement to cover the case of home
cultivation. In addition, it recognises that most cannabis users are otherwise
law-abiding people who obtain their supplies from an illicit source and
therefore come into contact with criminals. For a proportion of these
users, making cultivation for personal use legal will reduce their dependence
on an illegal market. This will act to reduce their exposure to criminal
influences or dangers, and may also erode the sales base of drug sellers.
Since this model has not been fully implemented
and evaluated in any country, no empirically based information is available
as to the likely outcomes of this model. Nevertheless, it is likely that
the main outcome would be to reduce the financial and social costs of
having personal possession and use a criminal offence. This option meets
the criteria of effective drugs policy to a greater extent than some of
the other options considered here. It separates cannabis from other (potentially
more harmful) drugs. It seeks to minimise the negative impacts of enforcement
regimes. It acknowledges the contradiction between the goals of limiting
cannabis use while minimising the negative aspects of enforcement. Finally,
its goals are realistic and attainable.
The fourth legislative option is
regulation.
In this approach, the production, distribution
and the sale of cannabis would be controlled to a greater or lesser extent
by government agencies. Trafficking outside the regulated system would
continue to be a criminal offence and attract penalties. Activities associated
with personal use, however, would not be penalised.
While no full working model of this option
is available, cannabis control in The Netherlands exhibits some elements
of the regulatory option. While the Dutch Government does not license
production, distribution or sale of cannabis, youth centres and coffee
shops selling cannabis products operate openly under certain clearly defined
conditions.
Examples of regulatory systems for drugs
other than cannabis exist within Australia. For instance, opium poppies
are cultivated under licence in Tasmania. A regulatory regime applies
to the drugs tobacco, alcohol and many pharmaceutical products. The two
major regulatory models for currently illicit drugs are regulated commercial
sale and government monopoly.
The option exists, within this broad
approach, for a range of initiatives to limit the attractiveness of cannabis,
including setting high prices through taxation and limiting the availability
of the product. The primary rationale for the regulatory option is the
recognition that the eradication of all cannabis use is an unrealistic
goal and that, since cannabis use will occur, it should occur in the safest
possible environment. It recognises that the gateway theory of drug use
(that cannabis users have an increased likelihood of progression to more
dangerous drugs as a direct result of using cannabis) is not supported
by empirical evidence.
The outcomes of a regulatory policy would
depend very much on the regime introduced. The most cited benefit of regulation
is the eradication or undermining of the black market for cannabis and
its associated crime and violence. The approach where the price of cannabis
is kept high and users must obtain a licence to use the drug, may not
result in the demise of the black market in cannabis. Neither is it likely
that black marketeers will disappear even if a regulated system provides
for most cannabis users - those involved with the black market are merely
likely to shift their involvement into other illicit activities.
Other regulatory approaches which require
the purchases of drug users to be monitored, which mandate counselling
before a licence to purchase is issued and which prescribe treatment if
purchase records indicate problem use, might be inappropriate and counterproductive.
Restrictive entry criteria and cumbersome administrative requirements
may disincline cannabis users to participate in a regulatory scheme. While
considerable financial and social costs could be avoided by the operation
of this policy, the complex system of licensing and monitoring could involve
high administrative costs. These implementation details would need to
be clearly worked out to attain a satisfactory balance.
The final option discussed here is
free availability of cannabis.
Like the total prohibition option, this
is an extreme legislative option. Free availability would mean the absence
of any legislative or regulatory restrictions on the substance's cultivation,
importation, sale, supply by other means, possession or use. This legislative
option is not practised in any country at the moment, but was the approach
used in Australia until the 1920s. It must be noted, however, that very
little cannabis use occurred up to this time.
Although a strong lobby exists for the
liberalisation of cannabis legislation in Australia, few lobbyists advocate
totally free availability. Perhaps for pragmatic reasons, at least some
form of regulation is generally deemed acceptable. This reflects concerns
about the quality of cannabis (eg. the presence of health-impairing pesticide
residues), driving or operating machinery while intoxicated by the drug,
its use by children, etc. Those who advocate totally free availability
do so on the basis of an extreme libertarian position.
It is difficult to imagine the free
availability option ever being fully implemented, particularly in Australia.
To do so would require governments to abrogate all responsibility in the
area of consumer protection, to forego taxation revenue and to take no
action to protect particularly vulnerable groups. Considering the position
of other drugs in Australian society, it is difficult to maintain an argument
for the free availability legislative option. This is because governments
have both the right and the responsibility to act to mitigate sources
of harm to society. The culture shift in most Western nations to minimise
the harm caused by currently licit drugs, especially tobacco and alcohol,
means that the free availability of cannabis is not a viable contemporary
option.
Compulsory treatment (pp. 71 - 94)
Although only a tiny minority of cannabis
users report problems with the drug serious enough to require treatment,
it is widely accepted that a prison sentence is an unsatisfactory option
for many offenders with drug problems, and diversion for the purpose of
treatment is a widely used alternative, one welcomed by judges and magistrates.
Criminal justice system involvement is seen as providing an opportunity
to intervene in drug users' lives in order to confront them with their
drug problems and to bring them into contact with treatment agencies.
In some cases, merely attending for assessment is sufficient to bring
about a change in a person's attitude. While some dispute exists about
the value of coercion, the fact that involuntary clients tend to spend
longer in treatment programs than do voluntary clients frequently contributes
to their exhibiting more successful treatment outcomes.
It should be noted, however, that few
cannabis users need treatment for dependence on cannabis as such. Rather,
their needs are more likely to centre around their lifestyles and psychological
needs generally. A number of countries, and within Australia the State
of Victoria, have legislative provisions relating to civil commitment
for the compulsory treatment of drug users, generally people deemed to
be drug dependent. In Victoria, for example, a person who is dependent
on alcohol and/or other drugs and who is considered suitable for treatment
may be committed for treatment for a period of seven days, and at the
discretion of the medical officer in charge of the assessment centre,
for a second seven days.
Civil commitment is widely used for
drug users in the United States. It is generally applied to people who
come to the attention of the criminal justice or health systems, and who
refuse to enter treatment voluntarily. The individual is referred for
medical examination and, on the basis of that examination, may be committed
to compulsory treatment.
Naturally, this raises serious issues
regarding the civil rights of the individuals involved, as decisions are
made about their liberty without referral to a court. The relevance of
such programs to legislative options for cannabis in Australia are limited,
owing to the fact that very few cannabis users have problems with dependence
on the drug, and there is little evidence that treatment, as it is generally
understood, has much to offer cannabis users.
Evaluating new legislative
approaches to Cannabis (pp. 95 - 98)
The principle of evaluating new policy
and legislation is widely accepted but is less frequently observed in
practice. In Australia and most other Western nations, insufficient has
been done, especially by government agencies, to monitor and evaluate
their national drug policies.
This is the case in instances where
drugs legislation has been developed incrementally, and also where new
approaches have been implemented following detailed policy reviews. Too
often evaluation is considered relevant only after a policy has been in
place for some time and changes are being considered. To be of most value,
new initiatives should be designed and implemented with an explicit and
adequately resourced monitoring and evaluation component built into the
initiative from the outset. Policy evaluation is a different process from
program evaluation, having different goals and research techniques.
Conclusion (pp. 99 -
102)
This paper addresses the legislative
options for cannabis in Australia, and argues that choosing from these
options requires a process of policy evaluation. Accordingly, the paper
considers the policy frameworks within which decision-making occurs, emphasising
the necessity for clarity in the goals that society seeks to attain through
legislating in this area.
The paper places contemporary Australian
cannabis legislation within its broader context: historical and international.
Despite the work of numerous Royal Commissions and other official enquiries,
much of Australia's legislation concerning cannabis reflects the dynamics
of earlier times, when Australia tended to mimic other nations' policies
without taking sufficient account of local circumstances. Our framework
of legislative prohibition was put in place at a time when there was virtually
no cannabis use in Australia. In the 1990s, when over four million Australians
report having used the drug and nearly half of them report having done
so during the last year, most jurisdictions maintain total prohibition
as their legislative stance, even though only a tiny proportion of the
offenders against their legislation will ever be prosecuted.
Cannabis is used mainly as a recreational
drug and this pattern of use is the focus of this paper.For completeness,
we have included information in the appendixes on the medical and industrial/agricultural
uses of the cannabis plant and its by-products. In doing so, we remind
readers that, in drug policies, we are not faced with 'all-or-nothing'
choices. Within the range of avaiable policy options lies the possibility
of prohibiting the recreational use of cannabis while permitting its use
for other purposes.
Australia's National Drug Strategic Plan
1993-97 provides the framework within which we base our recommendations
relating to monitoring and evaluation. The plan points out that 'the overall
mission of the National Drug Strategy is to minimise the harmful effects
of drugs and drug use in Australian society'. Policies and programs in
specific areas, including cannabis, should be evaluated in a manner consistent
with this national goal. Australia's National Drug Strategic Plan provides
a policy framework within which new legislative approaches may be developed.
Both existing and newer approaches have the possibility of both enhancing
and detracting from the achievement of the mission of the National Drug
Strategy, that of minimising the harmful effects of drugs and drug use
in Australian society. Decision-making relating to legislative options
for cannabis in Australia can be conducted in an ad hoc manner, but clearly
the application of more systematic policy choice models is preferable.
Two groups of such decision-making models
are available to governments, the 'rational' and 'incremental' approaches.
A rational decision-making model is one which goes through logical steps
to clarify the context of the legislative initiative, its goals, the rationales
for the goals and the likely impacts on key stakeholders. It includes
a careful analysis of the data available to evaluate the proposed approach.
The process would end in making judgments regarding the appropriateness
of the goal or goals, how achievable the goals are and, if the goals are
judged to be achievable, how effective, efficient and appropriate are
the implementation options available. This systematic, rational approach
to policy evaluation is not often enough seen in the development of drugs
policy. Nevertheless, the National Drug Strategic Plan provides a clear
framework for engaging in this type of analysis.
No best single option for cannabis legislation
exists. What is most appropriate will depend upon what goals both policy
makers and the community are seeking to achieve.
Our review suggests that two of the
five legislative options discussed above are inappropriate in contemporary
Australian circumstances. They are the options which we have characterised
as total prohibition and free availability. Australia experiences more
harm, we conclude, from maintaining the cannabis prohibition policy than
it experiences from the use of the drug.
We also reject the legislative option
of free availability of cannabis. Our society is one that accepts that
governments and others have both the right and the responsibility to intervene
in diverse ways to protect people from harm and advance the common good.
It would be unreasonable, therefore, to argue that cannabis should be
available in an uncontrolled manner.
Without seeking to be exhaustive, below
are some indicators which are significant inputs to policy and program
evaluation relating to new legislative initiative concerned with cannabis:
o The impact on social justice in Australian
society of the implementation of cannabis legislation
o Costs of cannabis controls, including the transfer of resources
o The effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of policies
and legislation
o Public opinion concerning cannabis
o Cannabis consumption patterns and levels
o Numbers and characteristics of the people presenting to treatment
agencies with cannabis-related health and social problems
o Cannabis-related offences
o Cannabis-related driving and motor vehicle crashes
o THC levels of the cannabis available to consumers
o Cannabis-related workplace accidents
We conclude that Cannabis law reform
in required in this country.
Many options for policy, legislation
and implementation processes exist within the broad categories of prohibition
with an administrative decision that it is inexpedient to prosecute people
for minor cannabis offences, prohibition with civil penalties, partial
prohibition and regulated availability.
We believe, on the available
evidence, that widely accepted social goals, well attuned to the needs
of contemporary Australian society, will be attained through the adoption
and implementation of policies which lie within these options.
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